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M'hand  FARES and  Elodie ROUVIERE*
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2 place viala 34060  Montpellier  France
Abstract: Food safety  economists  have raised  numerous  questions  according  to the emergence  and  
the  multiplication  of safety  quality  management  system  within  the  food  supply  chain.  However, 
few research  deal  with  the  voluntary  implementation  by firms  of these  systems  (Segerson,  1999; 
Venturini, 2003; Noelke- Caswell, 2000). Our paper  aims  to develop  a unified  analytical framework  
of these  research.  We obtain  three  results. 
First,  in a market  model  when  the  mandatory  threat  is strong,  the  voluntary  adoption  of safety  
measures  is an equilibrium  without  need  of the  cost  differential  assumption  (Segerson,  1999) nor  
of a reputation  effect  (Venturini, 2003). Second, when  the mandatory  threat  is weak the reputation  
effect  and  the  rule of liability could  induce  the  voluntary  adoption  on different  extent  depending  
on  the  situation  of safety  contamination.  Third,  in a supply  chain  model  we introduce  a retailer  
and   show   that   a   well   designed   contract   offered   by   the   retailer   induce   upstream   firms   to 
voluntarily implement  safety  measures.  Private  incentives  are thus  very powerful  and  can be used  
as the sole mechanism  to implement  the efficient  system.
Keywords : Food Safety, Voluntary  Approaches, Supply Chain. 
1. Introduction
In the  nineties,  the  multiplication  of food  safety  outbreaks  has  raised  concerns  about  food  safety  
both  from  governments  and  from  consumers.  In this  context,  food  safety  regulation  has  evolved  
from   performance   process- related   requirements   to   performance   standard,   granting   more  
flexibility  to  firms.  That  is, firms  can  choose  the  least  cost  method  to  reach  the  performance  
standard   (Caswell- Hooker,   1996;   Unnevehr- Jensen,   1996).   Consequently,   in   the   food   supply 
chain,  quality  management  metasystems(Caswell  and  al., 1998)  have  emerged  both  to  enhance  
food  safety  and  to comply  with  new food  safety  regulation.  Therefore,  papers  in the  food  safety  
literature  have mainly focused  on the  impact  of this  new safety  regulation.  For example,  Loader-
Hobbs  (1999) have shown  that  this  legislation  can  provide  incentives  and  opportunities  for firms  
requiring  very fast  strategic  actions.  Similarly, Henson- Heasman  (1998) have  analyzed  the  firm's  
compliance  process  to food  safety  regulation  and  show  that  firms  follow a common  sequence  of 
activities  when  they  have  decided  to  comply  with  a new  safety  regulation.  Buzby  and  Frenzen  
(1999) have  focused  on  the  US product  liability  system  for  food  contamination  episode  and  its 
impact  on  the  firm  incentives  to  produce  safer  food.  Others  research  analyzed  what  goes  on 
inside  the  firm.  For  example,  Unnevher- Jensen  (1999)  have  scrutinized  the  role  of  the  HACCP 
safety  control  system  as a public  standard  of food  safety, and  Henson- Hooker  (2001) have  dealt  
with  both  private  and  public  implications  of a private  management  of safety  controls.  Both  have  
documented  the  different  strategies  that  a firm  may  face when  it has  to comply  with  new safety  
requirements.  Caswell  and  al. (1998)  show  that  the  adoption  of  a quality  management  system  
affects  both  firm's  profit  and  competitiveness  in the food  supply  chain.
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2However,  if some  papers  analyze  the  firm's  incentives  to  adopt  quality  management  systems  
(Henson- Holt, 2000; Holleran  et al., 1999; Northen,  2001), there  is little formal  discussion  putting  
the  emphasis  on  the  voluntary  nature  of the  implementation  by firms  of these  systems.  A first  
strand  studies  a ''market  model''  where  the  firm  faces  only  to  the  regulator  who  can  impose  a 
mandatory   (public)   safety   system.   Following   the   large   body   of   literature   in   environmental  
economics  that  deals  with  voluntary  approaches  (see Khanna,  2001  for a survey), Segerson  (1999) 
develops  a model  to analyze  the  voluntary  choice of firms  assuming  that  a mandatory  program  is 
more  costly than  a voluntary  one. She shows  that  the only credible mean  to induce  a firm  to adopt  
voluntary  preventive  measures  is a strong  mandatory  threat  to be imposed  a more  costly system.  
Venturini  (2003) relaxes  her assumption  and  argues  that  a strong  mandatory  threat  is a necessary  
but  not  a sufficient  condition  to  induce  voluntary  implementation  of safety  measures  by firms. 
That  is, an  additional  government  intervention  is needed:  it must  help  firm  in  signalling  safer  
food  products  to  consumers.  A second  strand  analyzes  a ''supply  chain''  model  where  a retailer  
(downstream  firm) can  impose  its own  (private) safety  system.  Noelke- Caswell (2000) explore  the 
incentives  to  implement  a voluntary  system  in a simplified  supply  chain  where  three  different  
quality  management  systems  could  be  implemented  under  two  different  systems  of  rules  of 
liability.  The  authors  show  that  the  level  of  safety  the  firm  implements  through  a  voluntary  
quality  management  system  is always  higher  than  through  a mandatory  or a quasi- voluntary  one  
(imposed  by the  downstream  firm). However,  this  level depends  on  the  safety  level implemented  
by the upstream  (supplier) and  the downstream  firm  (retailer). They also show that  under  a rule of 
negligence,  firms  implement  a higher  level  of  quality  management  than  under  a rule  of  strict  
liability. Indeed, a rule of negligence  system  leads  most  of the time to over- compliance  by firms.
Our paper  aims  to develop  a unified  analytical framework  of these  two strands.  First, considering  
a ''market  model''  we analyze  the making  decision  process  of a firm  marketing  food  products  that  
will be consumed  in their  fresh  form  (e.g. meat,  fish, fruit  and  vegetables). This allow us to divide  
the safety  risk in two categories  related  to the consequences  of a contamination  on human  health.  
First, we distinguish  situations  of major  safety  risk  with  immediate  and  strong  consequences  on 
consumers'   health.   We   particularly   point   out   the   pathogenic   or   microbiological   risk   where  
products  contamination  could  be lethal  for  consumers  (for example  we could  find  such  a safety  
risk  in the  fresh  meat  or fish  industries). Second,  we distinguish  situations  of minor  safety  risk  
with   very   low   probabilities   of   strong   and   instant   consequences   for   human   health   after  
consumption  of an altered  product.  We have in mind  a safety  risk  as the  pesticide  risk  we find  in 
the  fresh  produce  industry  which  can  be qualified  as being  a ''minor''  risk  in comparison  to  the  
pathogenic  one. On these  statements  we thus  assume  that  the  magnitude  of consumer's  response  
following  a contamination  episode  will differ  according  to  the  type  of risks.  The  response  from  
consumer  will be ''hard''  in the former  case, and  thus  can destroy  the “reputation”  of the firm, and  
“soft” in the latter. In such  a setting  we show  two main  results: (i) when  the regulator  involvement  
in promoting  food  safety  is strong,  whatever  the  nature  of consumer  response,  neither  the  cost  
differential  assumption  (Segerson,  1999) nor  the reputation  effect  (Venturini, 2003) are needed  to 
implement   a   voluntary   safety   system;   (ii)   when   the   regulator   involvement   is   weak,   two 
mechanisms  may have some  impact: the  reputation  effect  and  the rule of liability. However, when  
the  consumer  response  is “soft”, there  is no  reputation  effect  and  only  the  rule  of liability  may 
induce  the  voluntary  adoption  of safety  measures  by firms.  This result  raises  issues  of the design  
of the  rule  of liability  and  of the  effectiveness  of civil litigations  in situations  of safety  failures  
when  the  response  from  consumers  is  “soft”.  Second,  maybe  the  addition  of  some  “private”  
incentives  may  solve  the  problem.  Introducing  a retailer  (namely,  supermarkets)  in  the  supply  
chain  model, we show  that  a well designed  contract  offered  by “a large scale retailer” can  induce  
upstream  firms  to voluntarily implement  safety measures.  That  is “private  incentives” provided  by 
the  retailer  are  very powerful  and  can  be used  as the  only mechanism  to implement  the  efficient  
choice.
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2 deals  with  the  market  model.  Section  3 extends  the  
framework  to deal with the firm's  decision  to voluntarily adopt  safety  measures  in a supply  chain. 
Sections  4 concludes.
32. A market model
In this  section,  we develop  a model  that  focuses  on a firm  face to the regulator  and  “the market'”, 
that  is consumer.  The model  does  not  deal with  the  regulator's  willingness  to pay to induce  firm  
to voluntarily implement  measures  to improve  food  safety  (“carrot”  approach). The firm  will thus  
not   receive   subsidies   for   voluntarily   implementing   safety   measures.   Therefore,   incentives   to 
implement  voluntary  measures  comes  from:  (i) the  regulator  ability  to  impose  to  the  firm  a 
mandatory  system  improving  food  safety  (“stick” approach); (ii) the  different  types  of sanctions  
(economic  and  legal)  that  the  consumers   (“the  market”)  can  impose  to  the  firm  following  a 
contamination  episode.
2.1. Set up
We consider  a  two- stage  game  (see  Figure  1). In the  first  stage,  the  firm  has  two  courses  of 
actions:  (i) implementing  a voluntary  safety  system  to produce  and  market  safer  products;  (ii) not  
to  voluntarily  take  any  safety  measures.  If the  firm  implements  a voluntary  safety  system  the 
game  is over. If the firm  decides  not  to implement  voluntary  safety measures,  the game  continues.  
Thus,  in the  second  stage  the  regulator  intervenes  with  a probability  r 0;1  . We assume  that  r is 
an  exogenous  probability, which  reflects  the  probability  that  the  regulator  imposes  a mandatory  
safety  system  to the firm. When  r 0 there  is no mandatory  threat,  albeit when  r 1 the imposition  
of  a mandatory  system  is certain.  Whatever  the  firm's  decision,  a contamination  episode  may 
occur.  If the  firm  does  not  adopt  any  voluntary  safety  measures  and  the  regulator  does  not  
impose  any  mandatory  safety  measures,  there  is  a  probability     p 0;1    that  a  contamination  
episode   occurs.   When   (voluntary   or   mandatory)   safety   measures   are   undertaken,   there   is   a 
probability  q 0;1   of contamination.  Since undertaking  (voluntary  or mandatory) safety  measures  
can reduce  contamination  risks  but  does  not  allow to completely  avoid  it we assume  that  0 q p . 
We suppose  that  p  and  q  are  exogenous  probabilities.  When  a contamination  episode  occurs,  
consumers  may sue the firm  for damages.  Let  L denote  the  positive amount  to be paid  related  to 
the  judicial proceedings  following  a contamination  episode.  L  will depend  on the  rule of liability 
which  is operative regarding  the payment  of damages  for injured  consumers.
Concerning   the   payoff   function   of   the   firm,   consider   first   the   cost   of   implementing   safety  
measures.  Let   CV  and  CM   be the  costs  that  a firm  bears  when  it reaches  a given  level of food  
safety  through  respectively  a voluntary  and  a mandatory  safety  system.  Following  the  voluntary  
approaches   literature   in   the   environmental   economics,   Segerson   (1999)   assumes   that   the 
compliance   costs   associated   to   the   implementation   of   a   mandatory   safety   system   (training  
employees,   record   keeping   equipment,   etc.)   are   higher   than   those   associated   to   the  
implementation   of   a   voluntary   one.   In   contrast,   Venturini   (2003)   suggests   that   such   a   cost  
differential  is not  supported  by empirical  evidence  on  the  implementation  of safety  system  such  
as HACCP1.
Therefore,  in what  follows  we suppose  as Venturini  (2003) that   C CM CV 0 . Consider  now  the 
firm's  benefit  of  implementing  safety  measures.  Following  Venturini  (2003), and  in  contrast  to 
Segerson   (1999),   we   split   the   gross   benefit   of   implementing   voluntary   measures   in   three  
components.  That  is  BV B0 BD BR , where    B0   reflects  the  net  revenue  from  products  sales,     BD 
the  direct  market  benefit  due  to  an  increased  demand  for  its  product  as  a result  of  increased  
safety,  and    BR   the  benefit  due  to  the  firm's  stock  of reputation.  Similarly, when  the  regulator  
imposes  a mandatory  safety system  to the firm, it will receive BM BD B0 . When no safety measures  
(voluntary   or   mandatory)   are   implemented,   it   only   receives  B0  its   benefit   from   the   sale   of 
products.  This implies  that  the minimum  benefit  the firm  can get is B0 . Moreover, since the direct  
market  benefit  BD is the  same  whether  the  firm  implements  a voluntary  or  a mandatory  safety  
1See Colatore  and  Caswell, 1999; Zaibet  and  Bredhal, 1997.  For example,  Colatore  and  Caswell (1999) show  that  for  eight  
breaded  fish companies  the costs  adoption  of a mandatory  HACCP raises  the annual  total costs  of only 0.25%.
4system,  the ''incentive'' component  for a firm  to adopt  voluntary  safety  measures  is BR , that  is the 
benefit  due  to its stock  of reputation.  We assume  that  after  a contamination  episode  BR could  be 
altered,  even if  BR  still remains  nonnegative. Indeed,  the firm  may loose  its ''good  reputation’’ (BR 
can decrease  to 0) depending  on the magnitude  of consumers'  response  following a contamination  
episode.  We consider  two  situations.  First,  a contamination  episode  leads  to  a ''hard''  response  
from  consumers  because  of  strong  or  lethal  consequences  following  a contamination  episode  
(pathogenic  risk  in the  fresh  meat  sector). In that  case, a contamination  episode  is followed  by a 
dramatic  fall of the  firm's  reputation.  Second,  a contamination  episode  leads  to a ''soft''  response  
from  consumers.  This is the  case  with  pesticides  issues  in the  fresh  produce  industry  since  most  
of  the  time  consumers  are  not  fully  aware  about  health  problems  linked  to  consumption  of 
contaminated  fruit and  vegetables  which primarily have not instant  but  cumulative effects.
2.1. Case 1: Contamination  involving  a hard response  from  the 
consumer
We   refer   here   to   situations   where   contamination   episode  may   have   immediate   and   strong  
consequences  (lethal) for consumers.  In such  cases, firms,  which  have marketed,  altered  products  
face to very high  commercial stakes. When the firm  has  undertaken  a voluntary  safety  system  and  
there  is no  contamination  episode,  the  firm  gets  all the  net  full return   BV CV  from  voluntarily 
increasing  products  safety. In contrast,  when  a contamination  episode  occurs  with a probability q , 
then  the  the  firm  gets  only  B0 CV L . Indeed,  in such  a case  the  "hard" consumer's  response  has  
two consequences.  First, the benefit  decreases  from  BV  to  B0  since  the  reputation  and  increased  
demand  components  associated  to  the  increased  food  safety  measure  disappear  (i.e.  BD BR 0 ). 
Second,  it must  pay an additional  fee  L  due  to legal proceedings.  Therefore,  the  expected  payoff  
that  a firm  gets  when  it voluntarily implements  safety  measures  is   q B0 CV L 1 q BV CV  . When 
the   firm   has   not   voluntarily   undertaken   any   safety   measures   and   the   regulator   imposes   a 
mandatory  safety  system,  the reputation  component  in the benefit  disappears  since the measures  
are  mandatory.  Therefore,  the  net  return  from  increasing  the  safety  is   BM CM . When  no  safety 
measure  have  been  implemented  (voluntary  or  mandatory),  the  gross  benefit  reduces  to  the  
minimum  gross  benefit   B0 . In both  situations,  the  occurence  of a contamination  episode  implies  
only  a reduction  of the  expected  losses  relative  to  the  payments  of damages  L . Therefore,  the 
expected   payoff   that   a   firm   gets   when   no   voluntary   measures   are   undertaken   is 
r q B0 CM L 1 q BM CM 1 r B0 pL   .   Then   implementing   a   voluntary   safety   system   is   an 
equilibrium  if: 
q B0 CV L 1 q BV CV r q B0 CM L 1 q BM CM 1 r B0 pL
 or equivalently 
qB0 CV qL 1 q BV r qB0 CM qL 1 q BM 1 r B0 pL   #    (1)
  Following  Segerson's  suggestion  (1999)  we consider  now  two  extreme  cases  depending  on  the 
magnitude  of the regulator's  involvement  in promoting  food  safety.
2.1.1. Strong  mandatory  threat  r 1  
The   regulator   imposes   mandatory   measures   if   the   firm   does   not   voluntarily   adopt   safety  
measures.  Then  (1) becomes  
1 q BV BM CM CV
or 
1 q BR C   #    (2)
5 Condition  (2) implies  that  the  reputation  component  of the  benefit  (BR   must  outweigh  the  cost  
differential   C . Since we assumed  that    C 0 , condition  (2) is then  
1 q BR 0 (3)
which  always  holds  because  BR is positive.  This  result  implies  first  that,  in contrast  to  Segerson  
(1999),  a positive  cost  differential  assumption  is  not  necessary  to  sustain  voluntary  measures  
when  there  is  a  strong  mandatory  threat.  Indeed,  if having  a good  reputation  generate  some  
benefits,  then  the  firm  adopts  voluntary  safety  measures.  Moreover,  it  is  easier  for  firms  to 
implement   voluntary   safety   measures  when   there   is   no   cost   differential   than   when   such   a 
differential  exists.  Second,  contrarily to Venturini  (2003) claim, there  is no need  of a government  
intervention  supporting  safety  signalling  to implement  reputation  effect.  Even if the  firm  has  no 
reputation,  that  is  BR 0 , condition  (3) is trivially satisfied.
2.1.2."Laissez  faire" policy    r 0  
If the government  does  not  impose  to the firm  a mandatory  safety  system,  then  (1) becomes  
qB0 CV qL 1 q BV B0 pL
 or, equivalently 
1 q BD BR p q L CV   #    (4)
This  condition  implies  with  a ''laissez- faire''  policy,  the  adoption  of a voluntary  safety  system  
depends   on   two   mechanisms:   a   ''carrot''   and   a   ''stick''.   The   ''carrot''   corresponds   to   the  
components   of   the   benefit   (BD BR   that   can   increase   when   voluntary   safety   measures   are  
implemented.  This  potential  increase  can  be  quite  weak  since  BD  can  be  very  low  because  of 
difficulties  in signalling  food  safety  to  consumers 2. But, if a good  reputation  has  a high  return,  
then  BR  can  be  high  enough  to  induce  a voluntary  adoption  of safety  measures  improving  the  
safety  of products  it sells.  Second,  the  ''stick''  corresponds  to  the  reduction  of  expected  losses  
related  to judicial proceedings  ( p q L ) following  a contamination  episode  occurrence.  Therefore,  
designing  an efficient  legal rule is an issue. For example, the rule of negligence, which  is operative 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  can  be  an  efficient  solution  to  implement  voluntary  safety  measures.  
Indeed,  under  the  rule of negligence, when  a contamination  episode  occurs  the  firm  is held  liable 
if the  level of the  safety  system  it has  implemented  is equal  or lower  than  what  the  court  could  
expect.  Therefore,  this  rule  often  leads  firms  to  “overinvest”  in safety  measures  to  comply  with 
the ''standard''  of the court  (Noelke and  Caswell, 2000).
2.2. Case 2: Contamination  involving  a soft  response  from  the 
consumer
In this  section  we deal  with  situations  where,  following  a contamination  episode,  unawareness  
about  the  safety  risk  leads  to a weak  response  from  the  consumer.  This  statement  is relevant  in 
cases  where  the  appraisal  of safety  risks  and  contamination  occurrence  are  quite  difficult  and  
costly  to  monitor.  Because  the  consequences  of a contamination  episode  are  not  instant  in such  
cases  these  risks  can  be  assumed  as  cumulative  and  have  long- term  effects  on  human  health.  
Moreover,  because  it is difficult  and  costly  to  detect  and  to  monitor,  the  likelihood  of a broad  
contamination  is quite  low. To take  into  account  of the  specificity  of this  safety  risk  we suppose  
here  that    q   and    p   do  not  more  reflect  the  likelihood  of  a contamination  episode,  but  the  
probabilities  for  a firm  to  fail to  a test  aiming  to  monitor  the  safety.  In the  case  of failure,  the  
2For example  in France, signalling food  safety is indirectly prohibited  by law (Codron  et al.. forthcoming ).
6firm's  benefit  is supposed  to be softly affected  since consumers  are unaware  about  the safety  risk. 
That  is, in contrast  to the  case  1, when  the  firm  implements  a voluntary  system  the  firm  gets  all 
the  net  full return  (BV CV   from  increasing  food  safety  even  if a contamination  episode  occurs.  
Given this slight  modification  in the firm's  payoff, now a voluntary  strategy  is an equilibrium  if 
BV CV qL r BM CM qL 1 r B0 pL   #    (5)
As previously, we consider  two extreme  cases.
2.2.1.Strong  mandatory  threat  r 1  
Here, the mandatory  threat  to impose  a safety  measure  is certain.  In this  case, the firm  will adopt  
voluntary  measures  if and  only if 
BV CV qL BM CM qL   #   
or equivalently 
BR 0 (6)
 The condition  (6) always  holds  because  BR  is nonnegative. Even if BR is equal to zero, i.e. there  is 
no  gain  to  have  a good  reputation  then  condition  (6) is trivially  satisfied.  Thus,  no  additional  
constraint  is needed  to induce  the implementation  of a voluntary  safety  system.
2.2.2."Laissez  faire" policy    r 0  
That  is  the  regulator  does  not  impose  a mandatory  safety  measure  within  the  firm.  Then,  (5) 
becomes  
BV CV qL B0 pL
or,
BD BR p q L CV   #    (7)
As in (4), the  firm  voluntary  adoption  of a safety  system  depends  on  the  same  both  mechanisms  
(stick  and  carrot)  which  have  to  outweigh  CV . However,  if the  carrot  mechanism  (firm's  stock  of 
reputation)  is still effective, there  is a need  to discuss  about  the  nature  of stick  mechanism  (the  
legal issue). As in the "hard" response  case, there  is a need  to a well- designed  rule of liability. Civil 
litigations  could  be efficient  if the  consequences  of a contamination  episode  are instant  and  thus  
consumers   can   sue   firms   which   have   not   be   enough   preventive.   In   such   cases,   the   rule   of 
negligence  can be considered  as the best  instrument  since a firm  can avoid  judicial proceedings  if 
it has  implemented  a level of safety  higher  than  the  court  can  expect.  However,  civil litigations  
cannot  be efficient  when  consequences  of a contamination  episode  are  not  instant  and  when  it 
can  take  decades  before  people  gets  sick. Indeed,  consumers  cannot  sue  a firm  which  failed  to  
provide  safe  goods  because  it is both  difficult  and  costly,  and  most  of the  time  impossible,  to 
prove  the  real  nature  of a contamination.  In such  a situation,  the  rule  of liability  must  not  be  
linked  to  the  "outcome"  (is there  a contamination  or  not?) but  to  the  "process"  (does  the  firm  
comply  to  the  monitoring  plan  designed  by the  regulator?). For example,  in France  importers  or  
producers  of fresh  produce  are held  liable under  criminal  law if they  fail to the  pesticide  testing  
designed  by the government  agency (Codron  et al., forthcoming ).
3. A supply  chain model
7In this  section,  we extend  our  previous  market  model  by introducing  a new player: a retailer. That  
is, we assume  now that  the firm  does  not take decisions  only with regard  to the regulator,  but  also  
to  a retailer.  Following  Noelke  and  Caswell  (2000),  we thus  consider  a simplified  supply  chain  
where  the  previous  firm  (upstream  firm) does  not  market  directly  its  goods  but  sells  them  to  a 
"large  scale  retailer" (downstream  firm). We aim  to  determine  on  what  extend  private  incentives  
from  the  retailer  can  influence  the  decision  of the  upstream  firm  to  adopt  voluntary  measures  
when  the consumer  response  is soft.
3.1. Set up
Now, our  model  is a four- stage  game  (see Figure 2). The structure  of the game  is the following. In 
the   first   stage,   the   retailer   offers   a   take- it- or- leave- it   contract.   If  the   firm   accepts   such   a 
contract,  the  game  continues . In the  second  stage,  the  firm  chooses  to  implement  a voluntary  
safety  system  or not.  If the  firm  adopts  a voluntary  safety  system,  the  game  is over . If the  firm  
does  not  implement  a voluntary  safety  system,  then  the  regulator  intervenes  in the  third  stage  
with  a probability  r  0,1  . If the  regulator  intervenes  and  imposes  a mandatory  safety  system  to 
the  firm,  then  the  game  is over. If the  regulator  does  not  impose  a mandatory  safety  system,  the 
retailer  intervenes  in the  fourth  stage  and  imposes  its own safety  system  at a probability   s  0,1  . 
The  retailer  is supposed  to  test  only  the  compliance  with  the  safety  public  standard,  since  we 
assume  that the  retailer  does  not  aim  to provide  a stronger  safety  standard  than  the  public one. 
That  is, there  is some  kind  of "task  sharing" between  the  regulator  and  the  retailer: the  regulator  
designs  the  (public) safety  standard  and  the  retailer  enforces  (monitors  the  compliance  with) the  
standard.  Thus, a product  fails to the retailer safety testing  with a probability q   0,1  whatever  the 
firm  has  implemented  or not  a safety  system.
Following  Noelke  and  Caswell  (2000), we distinguish  four  types  of safety  systems:  (i) voluntary  
safety   system ,  where   the   firm   voluntarily   undertakes   safety   measures.   The   firm   decides   to 
implement  a  safety  system  improving  the  safety  of  products  without  any  explicit  prompting,  
neither  by the retailer  nor  by the regulator; (ii) a quasi- voluntary  safety  system , where  without  any 
explicit  prompting  by the  regulator  to implement  safety  measures  the  firm  could  be forced  to do  
so by the retailer. Then, the firm  must  implement  the retailer's  requirement  and  increase  its safety  
level. This system  is not  really voluntary  because  firm  if they want  to keep  their  contract  with  the  
retailer  are  obliged  to implement  these  systems;  (iii) mandatory  safety  system , where  all the  firm  
involved  in one  food  industry  are forced  to implement  a safety  system  imposed  by the  regulator.  
Note, that  the  mandatory  system  is compulsory,  the  public  system  is supposed  to  be prevalent.  
That  is the  retailer  is supposed  not  to ask  an  additional  safety  measures  to comply  with  its own 
requirements;  (iv) no measures , where  no safety  measures  are undertaken  neither  by the firm, nor  
imposed  by the regulator  or the retailer.
The payoff  functions  are also  slightly modified.  Concerning  the  cost  notations,  let   CC be the  cost  
associated  to the  retailer's  system  implementation.  For example,  CC can  be the  certification  costs  
that  the  firm  must  bear  when  the  retailer  required  a third  party  private  certification.  There  is no 
gain for voluntarily implementing  safety system  we assume  that  CC CV . Similarly, let BC represent  
the benefits  a firm  receives  when  it implements  a quasi- voluntary  safety  system.  Since we assume  
there  is  no  beneficial  advantage  to  implement  a quasi- voluntary  safety  system  rather  than  a 
voluntary  one, that  is BV BC, more  formally,   0 B B B B B
D R C V + + = = . Finally, the  introduction  of a retailer  
in  our  food  safety  game  implies  that  it can  design  a menu  of  contracts   P1,  P2,P3,P4 , where  Pi 
denote  the  private  penalties  that  the  retailer  applies  to  the  firm  when  it  fails  to  provide  safe  
products.  More  precisely,  P1  is  associated  to  a  failure  with  a  voluntary  safety  system,   P2   is 
associated  to  a failure  with  a quasi- voluntarily  system,    P3  with  a mandatory  one,  and    P4   is 
applied  when  the  firm  do  not  undertake  safety  measures.  Below, we assume  that  P3  P4,  that  is 
the  sanction  related  to  a  firm's  failure  is  higher  when  the  firm  has  not  implemented  safety  
measures  than  when  it has  implemented  the retailer’ system.
3.2. Private  incentives  and voluntary  adoption
8As in the  section  2, we consider  two  extreme  cases  depending  on  the  regulator's  involvement  in 
the design  of safety  measures  within  the supply  chain.
3.2.1  Strong  mandatory  threat (r 1 ),
If the mandatory  threat  is certain  (r 1 ), then  we get 
BV CV qP1 qL BM CM qL qP2
or equivalently, 
BR q P2 P1 0   #    (8)
 Since  q is always nonnegative and  BR 0 , then  condition  (8) becomes  
P1 P2 (9)
BR 0 because  there  are no reputation  effects  when  the  consumer  response  is soft. We have shown  
in  our  market  model  that  a  strong  mandatory  threat  is  a  sufficient  condition  to  implement  
voluntary  measure.  In a our  supply  chain  model,  an  additional  constraint  is needed:  the  penalty  
for  failure  from  the  retailer  associated  to  the  voluntary  system  must  be lower  than  the  penalty  
associated  to its compulsory  alternative, the mandatory  one (quasi- voluntary  system).
3.2.2."Laissez  faire" policy  with private  incentives   r 0
We consider  the  general  case  where  the  retailer  imposes  its own  safety  system  with  a probability  
0 s 1. In such  a case, a voluntary  strategy  is an equilibrium  if 
BV CV qP1 qL s BC CC qP3 qL 1 s B0 qP4 qL
 that  is, 
1 s BD BR q P1 P4 sq P3 P4 CV sCC (10)
 Since the consumer  response  is soft, then  BD BR are next to  0  and   CC CV then  we get 
q P CV sCV or q P 1 s CV (11)
 where    P P1 P4 s P3 P4  . This implies  that   P 0  and  , which  holds  if 
P1 sP3 1 s P4   #    (12)
That  is, the  penalty  associated  to  a failure  with  voluntary  safety  system   P1  must  be lower  than  
the  weighted  mean  of both  penalties  either  when  the firm  do not  undertake  any measures  (P4), or 
when  quasi- voluntary  measures  are implemented   P3 and  P4  . According  to condition  (12), if the  
retailer  imposes  its own safety  system  with certainty, then  
P1 P3
in contrast  if he does  not  impose  its own safety  system,  then  
P1 P4
These  results  imply that  a well- designed  menu  of penalties  can induce  voluntary  safety  measures  
adoption.  Indeed,  if the  retailer  chooses  P1 such  that  P1 min P2,P3,P4  , then  the  firm  will undertake  
9a voluntary  safety  measure.  And this holds  whatever  the mandatory  threat,  or the probability that  
the retailer  imposes  its own safety  system.  That  is, the private  incentives  provided  by the contract  
with  the  retailer  are  very powerful  and  can  be used  as a sole mechanism  to induce  the  voluntary  
adoption  of safety measures  by the upstream  firm.
4. Conclusion
In food  safety  economics  the  emergence  and  the  multiplication  of  safety  quality  management  
system  have raised  numerous  questions  from  food  safety  economists.  However, in the food  safety  
literature  there  is little formal  discussion  on the voluntary  nature  of the  implementation  of safety 
measures  by firms.  In our  knowledge,  there  is only  two  strand  of literature  dealing  with  firms’ 
incentives  to voluntarily implement  safety  management  system.  On the one hand,  Segerson  (1999) 
following  by Venturini  (2003) develops  a market  model  where  a firm  faces  both  to  the  regulator  
and  the consumer  to characterize  firms'  incentives  to adopt  voluntary  safety  management  system.  
On  the  other  hand,  Noelke- Caswell  (2000)  suggest  a supply  chain  model  to  determine  firms'  
incentives  to voluntarily implement  safety measures.
This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  provide  a unified  analytical  framework  of  these  two  strands.  We 
provide   two   significant   results.   First,   from   the   "market"   model   we   suggest   that   a   strong  
mandatory  threat  from  the  regulator  is a sufficient  condition  for  a voluntary  implementation  of 
safety   measures   be   an   equilibrium.   In   contrast   to   recent   papers,   we   show   that   neither   a 
differential  cost  between  voluntary  and  mandatory  system  (Segerson,  1999) nor  the  existence  of 
reputation  effects  (Venturini,  2003) are  needed  to  support  such  implementation.  However,  when  
the   mandatory   threat   is   weak,   the   voluntary   adoption   of   safety   measures   depends   on   two 
complementary  mechanisms,   a   "carrot"   (reputation   effects)   and  a   "stick"(rule   of   liability  and  
expected  looses  according  to judicial proceedings). Because  safety  is a credence  attribute  of food  
products  there  are difficulties  in signalling  safety  to consumers  and  thus  the reputation  effect  can 
be very  low. Thus,  the  sole  mechanism  that  induces  a voluntary  adoption  of safety  measures  is 
the rule of liability. How to design  an efficient  rule of liability and  how to enforce  this  rule in case  
of soft  response  from  consumer  are two interesting  questions  to deal with.
Second,  in a "supply  chain"  model  our  result  suggests  that  private  incentives  from  the  retailer  
(downstream  firm)  by  designing  contracts  with  the  firm  (upstream  firm)  can  be  used  as  the 
exclusive  mechanism  to  induce  voluntary  adoption  of  safety  measures.  These  results  raise  two 
interesting  directions  for  further  research.  On  the  one  hand,  we  could  extend  our  model  by 
exploring  how  do  our  results  evolve:  i) when  we  introduce  moral  hazard  in  the  relationship  
between  the  firm  and  the  retailer. That  is, we should  consider  that  the  detection  probabilities  are 
endogenous  and  determined  by effort  the  upstream  firm  makes  in monitoring  or in managing  the  
safety  products  it sells. ii) when  even  the  mandatory  system  does  not  satisfy  the  retailer  and  this  
latter  imposes  its own  safety  scheme  inducing  costs  for  suppliers.  On the  other  hand,  our  result  
suggesting  that  private  incentives  are the  sole mechanism  to induce  voluntary  adoption  of safety  
measures,  namely  the  efficient  one,  raises  welfare  issues  of the  enforcement  and  the  design  of 
safety  standard  by private  parties:  What  are  retailers'  incentives  in designing,  implementing  and  
enforcing  management  system  to provide  safer  food?  Avoiding  blame  for consumers  or capturing  
the  law?  What  are  the  consequences  and  costs  on  the  exclusion  and/or  the  reorganization  of 
suppliers  in the food  supply  chain?
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Figure1.A Market Model 
Figure 2.A Supply Chain Model.  
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